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Lawyers and Justices have often resorted to history to explain the
sixteen plain words of the establishment and free exercise clauses
of the First Amendment.' The books of the nonlawyers Morgan, 2 as-
sociate professor of government at Bowdoin College, and Smith,3 pro-
fessor of religious thought at Temple University, should help guide
those who search beyond case reports for the meaning of the religion
clauses. The two books also indicate how much this area of consti-
tutional law can profit from further historical research. 4
Nonlawyer scholars should not hesitate to embark on free exercise
and establishment waters simply because they must navigate through
lawsuits.0 The waters may be befogged in professional mystique, but
the clouds of jargon and methodology are penetrable. And certainly
t- Elizabeth Josselyn Boalt Professor of Law, University of California Law School,
Berkeley.
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof .. " U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
2. R. MORGAN, TIHE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION (1972) [hereinafter cited as
MORGAN].
3. E. S,irr, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1972) [hereinafter cited as
SMITH].
4. It is no fault of the authors that their commentaries have been superseded
before their ink was dry or at least before this reviewer could see how dry it was.
Morgan's book takes us through the Amish case, hailed by the press as a great victory
for religious liberty and proof that the Burger Court, too, could be liberal. Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Since then, the Court has already struck down New
York's attempts to contribute aid to nonpublic schools for expenses of mandated services,
Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 93 S. Ct. 2814 (1973), New
York maintenance and repair grants to nonpublic schools, and tuition and tax as-
sistance to parents whose children patronize them, Committee for Pub. Educ. & Re-
ligious Libcrty v. Nyquist, 93 S. Ct. 2955 (1973), and similar tuition assistance in
Pennsylvania, Sloan v. Lemon, 93 S. Ct. 2982 (1973). It has upheld the legality of
ievenue bonds in religious colleges, Hunt v. McNair, 93 S. Ct. 2868 (1973). See also
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). Compare Levitt, Nyquist, Sloan, and Hunt,
with Norwood v. Harrison, 93 S. Ct. 2804 (1973) (Mississippi textbook program which
significantly aids private schools that might discriminate racially held unconstitutional).
5. See, e.g., Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1949).
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neither legal scholars nor Supreme Court Justices have by their work
earned the right to preempt discussion of the religion clauses. On
these seas the Good Ship Constitutional Adjudication is not faring
too well. If the leaks and faulty steering cannot be permanently re-
paired by some master lawyer-historian, we can at any rate all bail
together.6
In eight brief chapters Morgan places in the contexts of social and
religious history the formation of the First Amendment and the prin-
cipal religion clauses cases, such as those concerning disposition of
church property, flag salutes, proselytizing of Jehovah's Witnesses,
parochial school aid, and public school prayer. Smith organizes his
discussion of religious liberty in America around the separatist, Cath-
olic, and American constitutional traditions. He treats American
Catholic and Protestant religious history more comprehensively than
does Morgan, but his insights into the development of religion are
unfortunately insulated from his analysis of the concurrently devel-
oping case law.
Morgan has not shied away from clear statements on legal matters
which a lawyer might have obfuscated with qualifications. Thus, he
says, "The conclusion seems inescapable that Sherbert and Braunfeld
cannot be reconciled. 1 On another occasion he quotes Justice Doug-
las' concurrence in Lemon v. Kurtzmans-"One can imagine what a
religious zealot, as contrasted to a civil libertarian, can do with the
Reformation or with the Inquisition"-and observes with trenchant
sarcasm, "Only civil libertarians, apparently, are fit teachers to be
paid from the common treasury."
His conclusions after examining Court treatment of the religion
clauses are three: The Court is right to preclude prayer in public
schools. But it should not interpret the establishment clause to bar
all aid to religious schools. And it should not interpret the free
exercise clause so as to allow claims of minority religions to override
6. It would be most helpful if all writers who use judicial decisions as part of their
data would conform to the standard method of citations of the law journals. Get a
Blue Book of Citations! To cite a case by the docket number only is frustrating to the
busy scholar. Some day perhaps all publishers can be induced to put footnotes on
the pertinent pages, as in Smith. The constant shifting back and forth, as is neces-
sary with Morgan, is annoying. For suggestions on bibliography, see S.minT reviewed
D. LeDuc, 66 LAw. LIB. J. 233, 234-35 (1973).
7. MORGAN 147. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1961). For a more qualified criticism of other seeming inconsistencies in Court
handling of religion clauses cases, see Louisell, The Man and the Mountain: Douglas
on Religious Freedom, 73 YALE L.J. 975, 985-97 (1964).
8. 403 U.S. 602, 635 (1971).
9. MORGAN 111.
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government regulation of essentially secular matters. 10 In general
Morgan favors retreat from the "quite sweeping theory of separation
articulated by Black in the early pages of his Everson opinion." With
apparent hope, Morgan adds that the Court might in the future adopt
Philip Kurland's suggestion that if "the primary purpose of the gov-
ernmental program be secular and the legislative ends satisfy the
public purpose requirement of the due process clause, governmental
programs which provide substantial support to religious institutions
are constitutional.""
One of Morgan's greatest strengths, especially helpful in appraisal
of Everson,'2 Allen,'3 and Lemon 14 (and now of Nyquist, Levitt, Sloan
and Hunt) 5 and with hovering-in-the-background significance for
McCollum,'0 Zorach,'1 Engel' and Schempp,19 is the candor with
which he treats the reality of the anti-Catholic tradition in the
United States. Morgan sketches with strokes too brief, but I think
never inaccurate, the history of American antagonism toward Cath-
olics. He begins with colonial intolerance and includes the burn-
ing of the Ursuline Convent in Massachusetts in 1834, the street
fighting in Philadelphia ten years later, the exhortations of Lyman
Beecher to resist the Pope's plan to take over the Mississippi Valley,
the American Protestant Association of the 1840's, the Order of United
Americans of the 1850's, the Order of United American Mechanics
which survived from the middle of the nineteenth to the middle
of this century, the Know-Nothing party, the American Protective
Association which counted one million secret members in the 1890's,
the Blaine Amendment, President Truman's frustrated attempts to
maintain a representative at the Vatican, and t0day's Americans Unit-
ed.-0 The history of intolerance is all unpleasant recollection and
observation, especially for Catholics; but neither scholarship nor truth
is advanced by blinking at it. Perhaps the spirit of ecumenical co-
operation following Vatican II and the election of a Catholic Presi-
dent have lulled Americans into believing that all is for the best
10. MfORGAN 206-10.
11. MORGAN 206. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
12. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
13. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
14. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
15. See note 4 supra.
16. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
17. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
18. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
19. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
20. MORGAN 46-52. Morgan might have mentioned Al Smith's campaign for President
in 1928. See S.ITH 134-36.
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in this best of all possible worlds of religious equality and freedom.21
Smith's book includes an informative narration of the American
separatist and Catholic traditions of freedom of religion. The sec-
tion on Catholic thought 2 is particularly welcome because the sub-
ject is presented relatively infrequently and is here supplied without
the distortions of subjectivity. Smith does mention the usual bug-
bears of Catholicism's critics-the Syllabus of Errors and the abso-
lutist thought of such men as John A. Ryan. But he also discusses
John Carroll and John England, nationalistic American Catholics of
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; Archbishop John
Hughes of New York, who in the 1840's struggled to obtain public
funds for Catholic schools in his state; Isaac Hecker, who believed
that Catholicism was precisely attuned to the American spirit; and
John Ireland, who in the late nineteenth century sought public funds
for the secular instruction offered in Catholic schools. Smith shows
that American Catholics regarded funds for education as proof of
their country's seriousness about religious freedom, rather than a
means to insulate themselves from the rest of society. Rich as is
Smith's treatment of the American Catholic tradition, one can only
regret that he did not pay more attention to the European back-
ground of Catholicism's development. For example, Smith might
have treated Bismarck's Kulturkampf and the French anticlericalism,
in order to judge the papal pronouncements of the era. The final
chapter in this middle section of the book is an excellent review
of the work of the Jesuit John Courtney Murray, who helped ad-
vise the Second Vatican Council. Smith notes that Murray went be-
yond the rationale of public funding of secular instruction in private
schools; he believed that religious schools, because of their religious
instruction and character formation, were vital to the welfare of a
varied culture.
23
In the last third of his book Smith concludes, with little reference
to his discussions of the Protestant and Catholic traditions in America,
that, "Separation of church and state cannot mean either the abolition




21. Cf. MORGAN 81. Note the use as an authority in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 635 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring), of L. BOETTNER, ROMAN CATHOLICIsM 360 (1962),
a book which can hardly be described other than as a defamatory anti-Catholic tract.
22. SMITH 156-244.
23. Id. at 239-40.
24. Id. at 362.
25. Id. at 363.
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a system of laws that secures the dominance of the popular power
in government as against any ecclesiastical power; that secures the
freedom of religion against manipulation or oppression by gov-
ernment; that avoids the alienation that arises from the refusal
of either church or state to take such cognizance of the other as
their propinquity requires; and that avoids the injustice to a
non-consenting populace that arises when the state patronizes
religion.
In more practical terms Smith favors public aid to enterprises which
do not engage in direct or indirect religious indoctrination but op-
poses, as an establishment clause violation, public aid to enterprises
of "religious indoctrination or worship."
26
The solutions recommended by Morgan and Smith for the modern
problems raised by litigants claiming rights under the religion clauses
are welcome additions to the literature on the subject. As histories,
however, their books are somewhat disappointing. The historical back-
ground of the religion clauses has figured importantly in many Court
interpretations of the Framers' meaning in these sixteen words of
the First Amendment. And the Court has often treated the historical
bases of litigants' free exercise or anti-establishment claims as indi-
cations of the merits of the claims.
27
26. Id.
27. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216-17, 223-24 (1972); Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 676-80 (1970).
The Court's resorts to history to interpret the religion clauses can well be criticized,
see text infra, but the Justices have revealed in the Selective Service cases that they
certainly need to look somewhere for guidance. Although the draft problem has been
mooted by the expiration of the conscription legislation, the Smith and Morgan dis-
cussions of the important Selective Service cases illustrate the Court's inability to apply
the religion clauses with logical consistency.
The 1940 Selective Service Act exempted those who "by reason of religious training
and belief" were opposed to participation in war. Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g),
54 Stat. 889. Cases split over exemption claims which cited the promptings of an "in-
ward mentor." Compare United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943), with
Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946). In 1948 Congress sought to re-
solve the problem by exempting claims based on a belief in "a relation to a Supreme
Being." Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 60), 62 Stat. 612-13.
In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), the Court confronted the possibility
that the 1948 Act unconstitutionally established religion by insisting on a belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being. Defendant Seeger would only say that he preferred to
leave the question of such belief open. The Court avoided the confrontation by a
striking verbal pirouette:
We believe that under this construction, the test of belief "in a relation to a
Supreme Being" is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies
a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief
in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption ....
380 U.S. at 165-66.
In Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1970), the Court heard a defendant who
refused to claim any religious belief. He prevailed because, Justice Black wrote for
the Court, his belief that taking life was morally wrong was held with a fervor equal
to that of traditional religious convictions, and § 6(j) required no more.
Negre, a Catholic with the religious obligation to distinguish between "just" and
"unjust" war and who conscientiously opposed the Vietnam conflict as unjust, might
The Yale Law Journal
But in his book Morgan tells us: 28
[H]istorical materials themselves will not settle anything. The
task of the judge is not the task of the academic historian-the
judge is not concerned with the loving recreation of the past
in all its diversity. The job of a constitutional Court is pre-
cisely to choose between conflicting traditions. The Justices of
the Supreme Court must decide whether they think the estab-
lishment clause should serve a peace-keeping purpose independent
of freedom of free-exercise of religion. If they do so decide they
should tell us why . . . then use the available historical ma-
terials to legitimatize the choice.
Morgan, I submit, believes in a most unusual degree of judicial
subjectivity. In principle, judges should not decide cases according
to what Justice Jackson called their own "pre-possessions, ' ' 2  and
then select freely among historical and case law precedents for jus-
tification. A Justice who believes, with William James, that "we
and God have business with each other," 30 would otherwise auto-
matically decide cases differently from one who thinks religion, and
especially revealed religion, a mere vestige of superstition. The for-
mer will select Roger Williams,31 George Washington and John Adams
as men whose philosophies underlie the First Amendment. And he
will note that the Constitution itself is not wholly secular, as he
calls attention to the exemption of Sundays as relevant days in limit-
ing the presidential veto32 and the dating of the document "in the
year of our Lord.' 33 The nonbeliever may instead emphasize the
absence of'explicit obeisance to the Creator, which had characterized
well have approached the Court with confidence. See Negre v. Larson, decided with
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 44041 (1971). The Court had held in Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), that a Sabbatarian has a First Amendment right to
participate in a state's unemployment insurance program when she refused for re-
ligious reasons to adhere to the state's requirement that she be willing to work on
Saturday in order to participate. Furthermore, in Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S.
385 (1955), a Jehovah's Witness who opposed participation in secular wars was held
to possess the requisite conscientious scruples concerning war, although he was not
opposed to participation in a "theocratic" war commanded by Jehovah. See also Clay
v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971).
But Negre'was naive; the Court did not want to allow selective exemptions such
as his and thus was in a strict constructionist mood. See 401 U.S. at 443. Negre's
theology opposed only unjust war, not all war; consequently he lost his case. And
besides, one might add, Sabbatarians win suits because they are very evangelical (Sherbert,
supra), and Jehovah's Witnesses because they are very persistent (see MORGAN 56-75).
28. MORGAN 186 (footnotes omitted).
29. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
30. W. JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 516 (Longmans, Green & Co.
ed. 1958).
31. See MORGAN 16 passim.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
33. Arguments that the Constitution was written with the intent of supporting re-
ligious freedom also cite U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3, the preclusion of religious tests
for federal officers, and refer to this as the ultimate protection of religious freedom.
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the Declaration of Independence and is included still in many state
constitutions. But the Court's synthesis of history should not depend
on the number of believers as against nonbelievers on the bench;
rather the Justices need to choose between competing traditions ac-
cording to which more truly reflects the meaning of the religion
clauses. This is a job in part for a historian. A true "loving recrea-
tion of the past" must be made which can lay moral restraints on
judicial uses of history and discipline subjective impulses.
Historians should, therefore, set themselves to criticize the Court's
uses of history. We are now told that the religion clauses mean that,
"Neither a state nor the Federal Government ... can pass laws which
...aid all religions . . . .,4Thus, one Justice has complained, it is
an establishment of religion to let "those who want to say a prayer
say it."35 I believe the Court has reached its conclusions from these
premises: (1) Among the Founders, Jefferson and Madison are of
overwhelming importance; (2) These two great Virginians convinced
their Commonwealth that radical separation, as described in Madi-
son's Memorial Remonstrance against Religious Assessments3" and
Jefferson's Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, was
desirable; (3) What they did for Virginia they did also for the Union
by helping to write and pass the religion clauses of the First Amend-
ment; (4) The establishment clause, therefore, is explicated by Jeffer-
son's "wall" metaphor. As Justice Black wrote for the Court in
McCollum v. Board of Education: "In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect
'a wall of separation between church and state.' ,,38
Without debating the wisdom of the Court's selection of Jefferson
and Madison as the Framers who define the religion clauses, a his-
torian might argue that neither Virginian was as radical a separatist
as the Court assumes. Morgan notes that church and state cannot be
totally separate, that the "wall" is just a metaphor, and that Jefferson
was not the only Founding Father, but he concludes that these ob-
34. This dictum of Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947), was quoted
in McCollum, 333 U.S. at 210, and subsequent cases, e.g., Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488, 492-93 (1961) (religious test for Maryland notary public unconstitutional); Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963).
35. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 445 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
36. II WRITENCS OF JAMES MADISON 183, reproduced in Everson, 330 U.S. at 63-72
(Rutledge, J., dissenting).
37. 12 HE-,ING, STATUTES OF VIRGINIA 84 (1823), reproduced in H. COMMAGER, Docu-
MENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 125 (1944), referred to as a Bill for Religious Liberty and
quoted in part in Everson, 330 U.S. at 12-13.
38. 333 U.S. at 211. Justice Black was quoting Jefferson's Letter to the Danbury
Baptist Association, see note 44 infra.
203
The Yale Law Journal
servations "do not alter one wit [sic] the radical separationism of
the Third President or his vast influence in American thought."a9
Smith emphasizes Madison's importance. He writes that Virginia
was not necessarily asserting the total separation of church and state
when it approved Madison's version of Article 16 of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights of 1776 granting the right of "free exercise
of religion."4 0 But Smith believes that "Virginia's approval of Madi-
son's amended text exhibited full awareness that it was now insuf-
ficient solely to guarantee toleration and necessary to reach toward
religious liberty. The action of 1776 formally launched the present
epoch of American church-state relations.
14 1
No one wishes to dispute whether Jefferson was a separatist or
whether Madison played an important role in launching American
church-state relations. The vital historical question is whether Jef-
ferson and Madison together launched a notion of establishment so
"wooden' -42 as, for example, to refuse children the right to say a
prayer in a common school. 43 The answer may lie in close examina-
tion of the content of the separatism of Jefferson and Madison. Such
examination could reveal many lacunae in judicial recreations of
the past. For instance, Thomas Jefferson's "wall of separation" was
verbally constructed in a letter to the Danbury Baptist Association
written January 1, 1802.44 On the same date he sent a copy of that
letter to his Attorney General, Levi Lincoln, and noted in an accom-
panying message that he had condemned "alliance between Church
and State.' 45 To ignore the latter in interpreting the former is com-
39. MORGAN 29.
40. The full text of Article 16 is:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of dis-
charging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence;
and, therefore, all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion ac-
cording to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to
practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards the other.
Quoted at SMITH 38. See pp. 206-07 infra.
41. SMITH 39.
42. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring in result).
43. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 445 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
44. THE LiFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON 332-33 (Koch & Peden eds. 1944).
This letter reads in part:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and
his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the
legislative powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate
with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared
that their legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between
Church and State.
45. IX WORKS OF THOMIAS JEFFERSON 346-47 (Ford ed. 1905). The note reads in part:
The Baptist address, now enclosed, admits of a condemnation of the alliance
between Church and State, under the authority of the Constitution. It furnishes an
occasion, too, which I have long wished to find, of saying why I do not proclaim
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parable, say, to a future historian referring to a modern president's
speech to a church group on the necessity of teaching children re-
ligious values, while disregarding this hypothetical president's letter
sent the next morning to a Senate committee considering an aid-to-
religious-schools proposal in which he qualified the generalities of
the speech.
Twenty years later Jefferson, as Rector of the University of Vir-
ginia, wrote in his annual report to the President and Director of
the Literary Fund (a report approved by the Visitors of the Uni-
versity, of whom one was Madison):
46
[T]he relations which exist between man and his Maker, and the
duties resulting from those relations, are the most interesting and
important to every human being, and the most incumbent on
his study and investigation. The want of instruction in the
various creeds of religious faith existing among our citizens
presents, therefore, a chasm in a general institution of the useful
sciences ....
Pursuant to Jefferson's suggestions the university promulgated
regulations providing that the various denominations could "estab-
lish within, or adjacent to, the precincts of the University, schools
for instruction in the religion of their sect," and that if they did
so the "students of the University will be free, and expected to at-
tend religious worship . . . -"' In contrast to all of the Supreme
Court's uses of the "wall" metaphor, I recall only one reference to
Rector Jefferson's report-that in Justice Reed's dissent in McCollum. 4S
Further evidence that the "wall" metaphor did not thoroughly
represent Jefferson's concept of religious liberty is supplied in a letter
he wrote to Madison from Paris, December 20, 1787, in which he
disapproved of the ratification of the Constitution without a bill
of rights:
49
fastings & thanksgivings, as my predecessors did.
The address, to be sure, does not point at this, & it's [sic] introduction is awkward.
But I foresee no opportunity of doing it more pertinently. I know it will give
great offence to the New England clergy; but the advocate of religious freedom is
to expect neither peace nor forgiveness from them. Will you be so good as to
examine the answer, and suggest any alterations which might prevent an ill effect,
or promote a good one among the people? You understand the temper of those in
the North, and can weaken it, therefore, to their stomachs: it is at present seasoned
to the Southern taste only.
46. 19 THE WRITINCS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 414 (Library ed. 1903), quoted in
McCollum, 333 U.S. at 245 n.11 (Reed, J., dissenting).
47. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 246, quoting from 19 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 46, at 449.
48. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 246.
49. 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 440 (Boyd ed. 1955).
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I will now add what I do not like. First, the omission of a
bill of rights, providing clearly and without the aid of sophisms
for freedom of religion, freedom of the press, protection against
standing armies, restriction against monopolies, the eternal and
unremitting force of the habeas corpus laws, and trial by jury in
all matters of fact triable by the laws of the land and not by
the laws of nations.
Historians must carefully consider if it is significant that in this
important letter Jefferson did not mention a "wall of separation" but
simply advocated freedom of religion.
Madison's stand on the issue is equally open to argument. When
the First Amendment was pending in Congress in substantially the
form adopted, it was reported that Madison said "he apprehended
the meaning of the words to be, that Congress should not establish a
religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel
men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience.",-,
This certainly seems history of different import and as much in-
terest to the Court as Jefferson's Letter to the Danbury Baptists.51
Moreover, even assuming that Jefferson and Madison desired,
sought, and obtained for Virginia a degree of separatism accordant
with the most extreme of the Court's decisions, it does not necessarily
follow that they sought or obtained for the Union the same measure
of separatism in the First Amendment. 2 Virginia was dissatisfied
50. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 758 (Gale & Seaton eds. 1834), quoted in McCollum, 333
U.S. at 244 (Reed, J., dissenting). The statement seems to accord with Madison's po-
sition on Virginia law, expressed in his famous Memorial and Remonstrance against
Religious Assessments. See note 36 supra. A careful rereading of the Remonstrance
shows its stress on free exercise of religion and freedom from preferential treatment by
reason of any establishment. The question so often quoted in support of the extremities
of today's establishment holdings-"That the same authority which can force a citizen
to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment,
may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever"-seenis
on its face a plea against preference for any one religion, whether Christianity itself,
or any denomination thereof. Moreover, in view of the pronounced and repeated reieren-
tial regard for God expressed throughout, it seems strained indeed to interpret the
Remonstrance to spell out opposition to voluntary religious observances in schools or
aid for the secular education of those whose religiously predicated consciences catse
them to attend nonpublic schools. Cf. Jefferson's Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty,
note 37 supra, which ensued upon the Remonstrance. For the Court's latest summary
of the Virginia historical precedents, see Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 93 S. Ct. 2955, 2964 n.28 (1973).
51. The assumption that Jefferson and Madison were always as one on church-state
matters is an oversimplification, a point that Smith makes clear. Madison objected
strongly to a proposal of Jefferson in 1783 that ministers along with army officers,
felons, and certain others be ineligible for election to the Senate or House of Dele-
gates of Virginia. SMITH 60-61.
52. There is the additional question as to the applicability of the religion clauses
to the states. On this issue the original intention of the Framers is clear: The religion
clauses were to bind only the federal government. Madison's proposal to extend to
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along with other states over the absence of a bill of rights from the
Constitution, and it wanted to procure a guarantee of religious liberty
beyond Article VI's preclusion of religious tests for federal officers.
The state therefore formally requested this amendment:
5 3
That Religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and
the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and
conviction, not by force or violence, and therefore all men shall
have an equal, natural, and unalienable right to the free exercise
of religion, according to the dictates of their conscience, and
that no particular sect or society ought to be favored or estab-
lished, by law, in preference to others.
On its face, this acknowledgment of obeisance to the Creator and the
outlawry of favoritism or preference seems a far cry from the Court's
proscription of all aid in Everson and McCollum. A historian's ex-
pertise would be especially helpful in resolving the threat this lan-
guage seems to pose to the Court's premises stated above.
Morgan and Smith have written books of such interest and value
to the religion clauses' interpreters that I am encouraged to con-
clude by inviting them and all scholars in similar areas to sail boldly
into the latest storm on First Amendment seas: the Court's discovery
of the "divisiveness" problem. We are now told by the Burger Court
that the religion clauses mean that a community must not be divided
along religious lines.54 To the extent that a legislative proposal for
a relationship between the state and nonpublic schools applies to
religious education, that proposal may be constitutionally intoler-
able. 5 And if such a proposal becomes statute, it may be struck down
the states a guarantee of religious freedom and separation of church and state found
no favor among the delegates to the Constitutional Convention. MORGAN 23.
Quaere, whether there has ever been a satisfactory Supreme Court rationale-as
distinguished from an ipse dixit-as to why and how the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment absorbs the establishment, as distinguished from the free ex-
ercise, clause. Compare Everson, 330 U.S. at 8, with Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943), and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The hardiest attempt to
state such a rationale is probably that of Justice Brennan in Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 254-58 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring), but it is more a critique
of the strong criticisms of the absorption doctrine rather than an affirmative showing
of how and why the absorption took place. In the end, the justification seems only to
be that the absorption is necessary to fulfill the modern purposes of the First Amend-
ment, as pronounced by the Court. Until repudiated, this has to be reason enough
for judges and lawyers, but certainly not for scholars, especially historians.
53, DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, 1788, FOR DELIBERATING ON THE FEDERAL
CoNSTITUTION 1788, in 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES (2d ed. 1866).
54. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("history cautions that political fragmentation
on sectarian lines must be guarded against").
55. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616-20.
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if it is deemed the product of a political contest among religiously-
motivated persons.56
The prohibition of divisiveness may, I suggest, lead to limitations
on the free exercise of religion,57 freedom of speech and press,58 and
the right to assemble peaceably and petition for a redress of griev-
ances. It also substitutes judicial hostility toward religion for the
promise in United States v. Ballard that, "The First Amendment does
not select any one group or any one type of religion for preferred
treatment. It puts them all in that position." 0 Moreover, a corol-
lary of the anathematization of religious controversy seems to be
that a state must not single out "a class of its citizens for a special
economic benefit."60 But will the Court adhere to its position to the
extent of invalidating the welfare legislation seemingly condemned by
this rule? Perhaps the corollary only applies when the class is defined
in part by religion; if so, free exercise may be restricted and divi-
siveness enhanced. Finally, it seems to me that citizens' honest, re-
ligiously-motivated entrance into the political arena in order to seek
legislation for social and also religious ends may be socially and
politically less divisive to the community than judicial condemnation
of such successful legislative efforts. In short, might not the Court
cause more religious controversy by holding public aid to religious
education unconstitutional than was caused by those obtaining the
aid? I outline these critiques0' of the divisiveness question in the
hope that scholars (perhaps psychologists) may analyze this problem
for the legal profession, including hopefully the Justices.
Morgan and Smith have helped the profession by indicating some
of the general uses of history in interpreting the religion clauses. Their
books reveal the large continuing role historians and other scholars
might play in the effort to explain and preserve in its manifold mani-
festations the elusive freedom of religion in the United States.
56. Nonlawyer scholars, this is not a law professor's brainteaserl Lemon, 403 U.S.
at 622-23; Nyquist, 93 S. Ct. at 2977.
57. Such a limitation may contradict the statements of the Court in Sherbert and
Yoder; cf. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory
flag salute unconstitutional).
58. Judicial condemnation of controversy because it involves issues arguably religious is
hard to reconcile with the reaches of the Court's protection of freedom of expression
in nonreligious areas, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) ("Fuck the draft"
may be written on jacket worn in courthouse corridor).
59. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
60. Sloan v. Lemon, 93 S. Ct. 2982, 2986 (1973).
61. Compare Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. Rv. 1680 (1969),
an impressionistic piece expressing primarily the author's subjective value judgments,
yet much relied upon by the Court (see, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622), with the com-
prehensive and profound study of Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to
Parochial Schools, 56 CALxF. L. REV. 260 (1968).
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Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT. By John Newhouse. New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1973. Pp. viii, 302. $10.00.
Reviewed by Walter B. Slocombet
The SALT agreements signed in Moscow in May 19721 perhaps
initiated the substitution of negotiation for confrontation in the nu-
clear arms race between the world's two supreme powers, the United
States and the Soviet Union. If so, SALT is a true jewel in the Nixon
Administration's otherwise increasingly pasty-looking diadem of first-
term accomplishments. The "historic essence" of the agreements, ac-
cording to John Newhouse's descriptive biography of the negotiations,2
is the American-Soviet agreement not to develop a significant defense
against the other's nuclear missile forces, each thereby leaving itself
open to retaliation by the other-and by third parties.
The abjuration of missile defense is embodied in the treaty's limi-
tation of each side to only two widely-separated anti-ballistic missile
(ABM) sites consisting of not more than 100 interceptor launchers
at each. The number of large phased-array radars, the crucial elements
of an ABM system, is also limited; thus the potential for expansion
of the ABM data processing and command system is controlled.3 Due
to President Nixon's insistence, the agreements include offensive limi-
tations as well.
Significant elements of the parties' strategic arsenals are unrestricted.
Thus, although offensive missile numbers are frozen at July 1972 lev-
t Member of the D.C. Bar. Mr. Slocombe served as a member of the National
Security Council Staff, 1969-1970.
1. The Moscow SALT Agreements comprise the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect
to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with an associated Protocol. These docu-
ments, along with "Agreed Interpretations" and "Unilateral Statements" interpreting
certain provisions of the Treaty and Agreement, the transmittal messages of the Presi-
dent, and the letter of submittal of the Secretary of State are reprinted in S. ExEc.
Doc. L, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as DOCUMNT L]. See also Treaties
and Other International Acts Series No. 7503 (1973) (Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems) and No. 7504 (1973) (Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms: Interim Agreement
and Protocol) [hereinafter cited as T.I.A.S. 7503 & T.I.A.S. 7504].
2. J. NEWHoUsE, COLD DAWN: THE STORY OF SALT (1973) [hereinafter cited to
page number only]. T.I.A.S. 7503 is printed at 273-77; T.I.A.S. 7504 at 278-81.
3. Of potentially great importance for further arms control is the agreement that
neither side will interfere with efforts to verify by "national technical means" the other
side's compliance with the treaty. Article V, T.I.A.S. 7504, at 4; Article XII, T.I.A.S.
7503, at 9-10. Such means include satellites and other nonintrusive intelligence-gathering
methods. DOCUMENT L, at xii.
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els,4 there are no limits on the number, size, or accuracy of warheads.
As a result the United States may retain and the USSR may develop
multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's). 6 These
defects in the offensive limitations, however, are far less significant
than the ABM Treaty, which effectively bars creation of a real ABM
capability by either side. In the paradoxical world of nuclear strategy,
defensive ability is a greater source of concern than offensive potential,
and ability to defend cities is the most dangerous capability of all.
The key to deterring nuclear war is the maintenance of an arsenal
of sufficient size and invulnerability to survive a first strike and de-
liver a nevertheless devastating retaliatory blow.
Defensive, rather than offensive, capability poses the greatest threat
to meeting this "assured destruction" criterion. No presently foresee-
able ABM system could defend against a first strike, but an ABM
system with significant capability to defend population centers would
arouse fear that it could defend against a reduced and possibly ill-
coordinated second strike.
Moreover, ABM's exacerbate the problem of the "persuasive brief-
er": Those who propose a first strike to the political leaders of a nation
must demonstrate that they could deal with any surviving retaliatory
force. The leaders of a nation not possessing ABM's would attack
first only if they were willing to risk near-certain national suicide.
If ABM's exist in sufficient number and quality, however, the advo-
cates of a first strike may claim with a semblance of plausibility that
4. The United States and the Soviet Union are allowed to deploy the number of
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) and submarine launched ballistic missiles
(SLBM's) treated as operational or under construction on May 26, 1972, that is, 1,710
for the United States and an estimated 2,358 for the USSR. Letter of Submittal,
DOCU.iENT L, at xv-xvi. There is also a special "sub-limit" on large ICBM's, intended
to control the Soviet SS-9 which can deliver a 25-megaton warhead. Id. at xv. One
megaton equals one million tons of TNT or roughly fifty times the power of the
Hiroshima bomb.
5. In addition, heavy bombers, of which the United States has many more than
the Soviet Union, are not restricted. Over Soviet objections, the agreement does not
cover "forward-based systems," i.e., American tactical aircraft based overseas which
could reach the USSR. Conversely, the United States abandoned its initial insistence
on limits on the Soviet intermediate- and medium-range missiles which threaten
American NATO allies.
6. The American MIRV's already mounted on Poseidon SLBM's and Minuteman
ICBM's gave the United States at the time of the agreement an edge of 3,400 to
2,000 in the number of warheads deliverable by missile. Hearings on Militai, Im-
plications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Before
the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 164 (1972) (Defense Depart-
ment estimates, as of July 1972). That gap will grow for at least a few years as American
MIRV programs continue. It was reported in August 1973 that the Soviets had just be-
gun testing MIRV's, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1973, at 1, col. 8; but the Soviet Union
can ultimately reverse the balance because it has a large advantage in missile payload,
eventually convertible into MIRV numbers exceeding American levels.
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they have a defense which makes first strike a reasonable course of
action. Indeed, the fear that one side is willing to so rely on its ABM
capability could, in a crisis, counsel the other toward preemptive at-
tack rather than restraint. The problem, in short, is that ABM's, by
eroding confidence in second strikes, endanger stability, particularly
in crisis situations. By restricting ABM's to essentially ineffectual
levels, the SALT agreements eliminate their destabilizing effect; this
is the major accomplishment of the negotiations.
In his introductory chapter John Newhouse skillfully expounds
the nature of the United States-Soviet nuclear relationship. His ex-
planation of the nuclear strategists' doctrinal debates, aptly compared
by him to the theological disputes of the early church fathers, provides
a sense of the issues at stake in the complex negotiations set forth in
the balance of the book. In his discussion of strategic doctrine, how-
ever, Newhouse repeats rather than validates the position of some
Administration spokesmen that approximate equality in strategic nu-
clear forces "would confer on the Soviet Union hefty political and
psychological advantages. ' 7 In fact, the Soviet Union acquired an
effective second-strike capability perhaps as early as 1962 and certainly
not later than 1966; subsequent increases in forces have given the
USSR no real additional military capability. If Western leaders be-
lieve, or say they believe, that the Soviet Union's redundant missile
capacity gives it some political advantage, no rational refutation will
dispel that self-fulfilling observation. There would appear, however,
to be little reason for Americans, who have no interest in conferring
unearned and nonexistent advantages on the Soviet Union in political
crises, to repeat the proposition.
Newhouse's book, however, is not primarily an analysis of nuclear
doctrine, but a narrative of a major event in recent political and dip-
lomatic history: a grand negotiation between the world's two super-
powers. Newhouse is by no means uncritical of the American role
in the talks, but, perhaps because he has excellent government sources,
he often seems to assume the perspectives of those in Washington
who directed the American side of the negotiation, particularly Henry
Kissinger. For example, he describes at length an essentially peripheral
question in which Kissinger was directly involved-Soviet replacement
of obsolete missiles on diesel submarines. He discusses much more
briefly the negotiation of controls on the giant phased-array ABM
7. P. 166.
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radars, a crucial issue which was left largely in the hands of Paul
Nitze.8
His emphasis on Kissinger's personal role does not prevent New-
house from rendering a striking description of the labyrinthine bu-
reaucratic processes behind the long negotiations. The principal Amer-
ican players were: the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, headed
by Gerard Smith, who was at once chief American negotiator at the
talks and also the leader of the agency most strongly advocating arms
control; the State Department, acting in the secondary role customary
to it in the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy establishment of the day;9
the Central Intelligence Agency, whose analyses of Soviet forces, un-
affected by a bureaucratic need to justify weapons programs, tended
to support those advocating arms limitations; the joint Chiefs of Staff,
whose cautious views (such as a preference for a simple, limited pact)
often paralleled those of their Soviet counterparts; and the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, divided but dominated by research and
development types unsympathetic toward restraints on technological
innovation. The American delegation at the talks largely mirrored
these bureaucratic divisions, and much time was spent negotiating
accommodations within that group. Over all of these presided Henry
Kissinger and the National Security Council staff. And very much
over Kissinger was the President himself, whose personal interest in
the process and its success emerges clearly in Newhouse's account. 10
Of the Soviet bureaucracy's divisions Newhouse inevitably reveals
8. Nitze was a dominant figure in the American delegation. Initially both the
Soviets and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff resisted any limitation on ABM-
capable radars on the ground that the issue was too complex technologically to lend
itself to negotiation and agreement. Nitze overcame these objections and won Soviet
agreement to a bafflingly technical rule. See Agreed Interpretation (a)[D] (clarifying
the limit on ABM radars contained in Article III of the Treaty), DOCU.MENT L, 9,
labelled Agreed Interpretation (a)F, T.I.A.S. 7503, at 23.
9. However, Ray Garthoff, a career Foreign Service officer who served as executihe
officer of the American delegation, played a key role in informally contacting equivalent
members of the Soviet delegation in order to test out tentative positions and draft
language implementing earlier general agreements. P. 213.
A striking sidelight of the whole SALT process as revealed in Cold Dawn is the
major impact of a few relatively low-level officials in a negotiation with such political
and strategic implications for the whole world. In Newhouse's view, Morton Halperin,
then a twenty-eight-year-old Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in the waning days
of the Johnson Administration, was instrumental out of all proportion to his age and
rank in guiding the development of a Defense Department position permitting the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to support the concept of SALT negotiations. Pp. 111-15, 126-30.
10, Further complicating the internal American relationships was the existence, un-
concealed at least after May 1971, of a "back channel" for negotiations between
Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador to Washington which paralleled, but when em-
ployed clearly superseded, the "front channel" of the formal talks, held alternately
in Vienna and Helsinki. According to Newhouse the exchange of information between
front and back channels sometimes seemed better on the Soviet side than between
Kissinger and the American delegation.
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far less. Such divisions did exist and occasionally surfaced. Most ob-
viously, the Soviet military, represented at a very high level in the
delegation, at times expressed to their American opposite numbers
positions which did not entirely coincide with those of the civilian
Soviet negotiators. And the latter betrayed a striking ignorance of
their own country's nuclear forces.
In a negotiation, Newhouse illustrates, certain issues assume a tac-
tical importance beyond their inherent significance. For example,
after both sides had in essence agreed that ABM's were to be re-
stricted to insignificantly low levels, an immense amount of time was
expended in determining exactly how much ineffective ABM capa-
bility would be permitted. The Soviets insisted on a low ABM limit
from the beginning. Also at an early stage, the United States, in what
Newhouse says Kissinger later regarded *as a blunder, advanced alter-
nate "low ABM" positions: ABM's would either be banned alto-
gether or each side would be allowed one site to defend its national
capital. Since the Soviets already had a primitive ABM system around
Moscow, they quickly elected the latter option.
The many-elemented American bureaucracy, however, developed
second thoughts. The arms controllers favored a complete ban. Kis-
singer, Newhouse says, believed that the American Congress was un-
likely to authorize construction of a Washington, D.C., site, and thus
feared the Soviet choice would mean one site for them and none for
the Americans. The Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff saw in the confusion an opportunity to press for an expanded
ABM system to defend American land-based missiles as a counterbal-
ance to the Soviet edge in offensive missiles which SALT envisioned.
The upshot was that Washington retreated from the offered, and
accepted, national capital option and advanced a proliferation of new
ABM formulae. After long bargaining the parties agreed to a limit
of two 100-interceptor sites each, one for the national capital and
one in a missile field.
Newhouse details all of this," but he does not seem to recognize
fully that the amount of time spent on the issue greatly exceeded its
strategic significance, for none of the formulae permitted ABM sys-
tems large enough to defend successfully either cities or missiles. But
-and this presumably helps explain the attention it received-the
issue of ABM levels was regarded as immensely sensitive politically.
The notion of "equality" seemed to be involved. Moreover, the pos-
11. Pp. 240-60.
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sibility of a significant ABM capacity died hard with the Nixon Ad-
ministration; Safeguard was once, after all, the centerpiece of Nixon's
nuclear strategy.
Finally, as a study in the dynamics of great international negotia-
tions, Newhouse's account highlights the importance of externally-
imposed deadlines, such as annual budgets, elections, Party Congresses,
or summit meetings. Such deadlines help induce governments to
make the political decisions necessary to move a major negotiation
to its conclusions. It is no denigration of the accomplishment of the
negotiators, nor of the risks of failure, to observe that the shape of
the agreement could have been predicted with reasonable accuracy
as soon as the SALT effort got seriously underway in the middle and
late 1960's. Indeed, in 1968 the Johnson Administration reached con-
sensus on a proposal which, although not specific on the crucial issue
of the level of ABM's to be permitted, nevertheless matched the ulti-
mate agTeement in structure and many other specific features.'
No agreement could be reached, however, unless the top political
leadership in each country forced their fractionated bureaucracies to
accept concessions. It was fashionable at the time of the 1972 Moscow
summit to criticize the Nixon Administration for suggesting in ad-
vance that the success of the conference would be measured by the con-
clusion of a SALT agreement. But without some such external con-
straint requiring that the myriad details be forced to resolution, the
negotiations could have lasted, if not indefinitely, at least far longer.
Such a postponement of actual agreement could have been fatal, for
continuing Soviet ICBM and submarine programs might have gen-
erated strong pressure for new American programs in response.
Indeed, the great mystery of the SALT talks is what mixture of
policy, politics, and analysis moved the leaders of the United States
and the USSR to overcome domestic political and bureaucratic ob-
stacles and reach agreement. In dealing with the motivations behind
the major substantive decisions of the SALT parties, as contrasted
with the tactics of the talks, Newhouse offers some important insights,
but his sources, good as they are, cannot provide unequivocal answers.
On the surface the Soviets derived little advantage from the Moscow
agreements. Their offensive missile buildup, despite lulls, appeared
to be continuing. By contrast, the United States did not even have
realistic plans to increase the number of its own offensive missiles.
12. The proposal was never advanced because the Russian invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia in August 1968 prevented the commencement of summit and arms control talks
with which Johnson wished to conclude his Presidency.
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In fact, Newhouse recounts, a study directed by the National Security
Council concluded that no additions could be made to the American
missile force for a period of at least five years. Nonetheless the Soviets
accepted a five-year interim moratorium on expanding their offensive
missile force.
According to the Nixon Administration's "bargaining chip" theory,
the Soviet Union agreed to the offensive limits only because they
wanted to halt the Safeguard ABM program. But, Newhouse notes,
Safeguard was encountering resistance even in the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee, once a pro-Pentagon stronghold. More broadly, there
does not seem to be any strong reason for the Soviets to make major
concessions in return for curtailment of Safeguard, since it could not
defend well either cities or missiles. And although the Soviets might
have feared the eventual deployment of a larger ABM system, the
United States had not instituted such a program.
One explanation of Soviet eagerness to reach a SALT agreement,
which Newhouse touches upon, is that the Soviets saw in the agree-
ment a means of aligning the two superpowers against China. This
theory is consistent with the quickly rejected Soviet proposal, revealed
for the first time by Newhouse, for what would have amounted to
a nuclear alliance of the United States and the Soviet Union against
all other nuclear powers. 13 However, concern over China is not in
accord with the Soviet insistence on banning nationwide ABM systems.
Newhouse writes that Kissinger fully expected the Soviets to insist
upon the right to build a nationwide ABM system to defend against
China. Yet they surprised Kissinger by making it clear quite early in
the talks that they regarded a low ABM limit as an essential element
in any agreement. The Soviets may have believed that a defense even
against China's still-limited offensive force was not technically feasible,
or they may have concluded that a nationwide ABM system would
have a destabilizing effect on their strategic relationship with the
United States and was therefore not worth whatever advantage it
might give them against China.
Some, not including Newhouse, have contended that SALT is an
elaborate Soviet trap: The Russians, having frozen their numerical
superiority in launching vehicles, will now use MIRV's to build the
capability, if not to carry out a completely successful first strike, at
least to destroy all American fixed land-based missiles. This military
advantage, it is said, will be exploited politically and diplomatically
13. Pp. 188-89.
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in ways as yet unknown. Proponents of this view argue that the ABM
agreement is the vital step in the Russian strategy because it bars
effective defense of land-based missiles.
This theory, apart from its unconvincing assertion of the political,
much less the military, utility of a numerical superiority in missiles,
cannot explain the Soviet concessions. Most important, a Soviet mil-
itary establishment intent on creating a dominant first-strike force
would not have acquiesced in the American demand for a separate
sub-limit on very large land-based missiles like the Soviet SS-9.14
These high-payload missiles are crucial to a first-strike capability be-
cause they can deliver MIRV's with enough yield to destroy missile
silos without requiring extremely high accuracy. One response to
this observation is that the Soviets will develop light and highly ac-
curate multiple warheads able to destroy silo-encased ICBM's. But
a willingness to rely on such speculative technological virtuosity would
be very much out of character with usual Soviet practices. In fact, at
the time the SALT agreements were signed, the Soviets had not even
tested a workable MIRV system for the SS-9. Only in August 1973
was there any official United States announcement that Moscow was
testing a true MIRV. And in making that announcement Secretary
of Defense James Schlesinger was careful not to say that the Soviet
MIRV's being tested could be developed to the accuracy required
for use against missile silos.15
Newhouse, finally, suggests that the Soviets came to share the view
held by the bulk of the American strategic community-though not
necessarily by Nixon and Kissinger-that mutual vulnerability to re-
taliatory attacks is the key to strategic stability in superpower relations
and that such stability is the best strategic nuclear weapons can pro-
vide. The willingness of the Soviet leadership seemingly to abandon
more ambitious political goals for Soviet strategic nuclear forces
would be consistent with a general Brezhnev policy of detente.' 6 This
14. The mechanism of this sub-limit illustrates the complexity of the agreements:
Article I of the Interim Agreement limits each side to the number of offensive missile
launchers operational or under construction at the time of signing. Conversion of
launchers to "heavy" ICBM's is banned by Article II. Agreed Interpretation J bans
any "significant increase" in silo size, DOCUMENT L, at 10, labelled (a)C in T.I.A.S.
7504, at 17, which could allow retrofit of heavy ICBM's into light ICBM holes. Com-
mon Understanding A defines such increases as those in excess of 10-15 percent,
DOCUMENT L, at 11, labelled (b)A in T.I.A.S. 7504, at 18. There is no formal agreement
on what constitutes a "heavy" ICBM, but an elaborate United States "unilateral
declaration" describes a heavy ICBM as one larger than an SS-I1 or SS-13, the other
two modern ICBM's in the Soviet missile arsenal in May 1972, DOCUMENT L, at 14,
T.I.A.S. 7504, at 20.
15. AvIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Aug. 27, 1973, at 16.
16. A possible corollary to this theory, not directly mentioned by Newhouse, is that
the Soviet civilian leadership now regards spending on the continued expansion of
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theory of Soviet behavior implies that still more significant agree-
ments may be achieved in the follow-up SALT talks now underway.
But neither Newhouse nor anyone else outside the Kremlin knows
with certainty what rationale for arms agreement dominated Mos-
cow's thinking in 1972.
If the reasons for Soviet agreement to the Moscow accords are
obscure, so is the basis for the crucial decision on the American side:
Nixon's sacrifice of the Safeguard ABM program. Newhouse seems to
ascribe Nixon's action to a belief that Congress, having passed the
initial stage of Safeguard in 1969 by the slimmest possible margin of
a Vice Presidential tie-breaking vote, simply would not pay for the
entire system. After all, Newhouse notes, in 1970 the Senate Armed
Services Committee eliminated funds for "advanced preparation" of
city-defending Safeguard sites from the second Safeguard request.
Undoubtedly Safeguard's difficulties in the Senate made the Ad-
ministration far more willing to reexamine the system's true worth
and to use it as a bargaining chip instead of an occasion for congres-
sional confrontation. Anxiety over congressional resistance, however,
can hardly have sufficed to persuade Nixon to abandon Safeguard.
The 1969 battle was, in the end, won, and the margin for the 1970
installment was, if not comfortable, at least not so narrow as in 1969.
Moreover, the crucial Nixon SALT decision was the proposal in July
1970 of "Option E," which would have held ABM's to 100 launchers
at a single site for each side. In "Option E" Nixon advanced for the
first time a low ABM limit in a relatively realistic proposal. Yet the
offer was made during the Administration's ultimately successful bat-
tle for Senate approval of the second Safeguard installment. If Nixon
had preferred a Safeguard system to a SALT agreement, he could have
terminated the talks by insisting on an ABM defense, and by blaming
the Soviets for the SALT failure he would very likely have gained
the political sympathy necessary to win the Senate ABM fight.
To attribute the sacrificing of Safeguard to anticipation of defeat
in the Senate may not only underestimate President Nixon's belief
in his legislative influence; it may also deny him deserved credit for
making the decision on the merits. It is at least plausible that, when
presented with an opportunity to put significant constraints on Soviet
strategic forces as offering decreasing political and military returns. Brezhnev seems
to want to raise the overall technical level of the Soviet economy. SALT will not be
a major moneysaver for either side, but for the technologically-pressed USSR, an agree-
ment which limits diversion of technical resources into strategic programs, especially
the computer-devouring search for an effective ABM, may provide a more significant
economy than direct cost savings would indicate.
217
The Yale Law Journal
offensive forces by a SALT agreement, he was willing to reexamine
his early commitment to Safeguard. And certainly Kissinger, who
strongly believed in the political and military usefulness of the Safe-
guard program, deserves credit for nurturing a bureaucracy whose
evaluations may ultimately have satisfied the President that preser-
vation of Safeguard was not worth the sacrifice of the arms control
opportunities which SALT offered.
The Nixon Administration's use of the SALT achievement is far
less creditable than the achievement itself. Immediately after the
triumphant return of the President from the Moscow summit, SALT
was used as the occasion for some strikingly ill-advised budget re-
quests, of which the worst-an effort to develop American ICBM's
potentially accurate enough to destroy silo-encased missiles-was killed
by Congress. Now, in the year of Watergate, seeking to defend itself
against charges of abusive exercise of governmental power in the name
of "national security," Administration spokesmen have invoked the
SALT negotiations as proof that leaks of information about United
States foreign and military policy must be halted, at whatever cost
to civil liberties. The Administration rightly senses that this is a po-
tentially effective argument because its severest critics would not have
wanted the SALT agreements jeopardized.
Cold Dawn, however, provides evidence to refute claims that pre-
venting. SALT leaks was a serious motive for the Administration's
"national security" measures, or that leaks of United States positions
were in fact a major obstacle to successful negotiation. Administration
complaints about SALT leaks generally refer to a story by William
Beecher which appeared in The New York Times in July 1971.17
That story, apparently derived from sources outside the White House,
contained a summary, accurate in outline but erroneous in key de-
tail, of a new position which the United States was about to advance
in the talks. The search for the leak's source involved the White
House "plumbers" and CIA lie detector tests of State Department
officials. But that 1971 leak could not possibly have been the reason
for putting wiretaps on the home telephones of White House and
State Department staff members from 1969 to early 1971, nor for the
approval in the summer of 1970 of a massive and illegal domestic
security operation.
Less obviously, leaks such as the one to Beecher were not uncom-
17. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1971, at 1, col. 7.
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mon and seemed to have had little impact on the talks. Beecher's
1971 story was by no means the first time that an American position
was previewed in the newspapers before being presented to the Soviets.
Indeed, the previous summer Chalmers Roberts reported President
Nixon's decision to propose a "limited" agreement (a numerical ceil-
ing without a ban on MIRV's) before Kissinger had even circulated
the President's decision within the American bureaucracy.' 8 And two
weeks later, Hedrick Smith accurately outlined in The New York
Times the details of the new United States position while it was being
presented to the Soviets in Vienna. 19 Similar apparently White House-
authorized leaks occurred at many other stages of the negotiations.
The Soviets occasionally complained, but no real interference with
the bargaining followed, nor did the Soviets seem to find any way
to make use of these brief advance warnings.
Newhouse himself has profited from a striking leak: His report of
the spectacular Soviet proposal in July 1970 for joint United States-
Soviet action against "provocative" attacks by smaller nuclear powers
must have been supplied from within the Administration.20 If there
is ever an argument for preserving the secrecy of negotiations, not
only while they are in progress but afterward, it would seem to be
when they involve such daring and far-reaching proposals. Even three
years later, news of the Soviet offer might well upset the British,
French, or, most relevantly, Chinese, but the Administration is not
heard complaining that Newhouse's book exemplifies the necessity for
halting "national security" information leaks. In short, on examina-
tion it turns out that SALT leaks are just like all the others. Those
18. Wash. Post, July 7, 1970, at A9; id., July 9, 1970, at 1.
19. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1970, at 1.
20. While the White House was almost certainly the source of many SALT leaks,
the degree to which Newhouse's inside information about the Soviet proposal had actual
White House approval is unclear. There would appear to be no political or bureau-
cratic payoff for the White House in the revelation. At his confirmation hearings
Kissinger acknowledged that he had given the NSC staff "guidelines" for revealing
information to Newhouse. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee declined his in-
vitation to make the "guidelines" public, but Kissinger testified that they permitted
the staff to "explain to him [Newhouse] positions that were more or less publicly
known, that had already been presented to the other side, and to explain our thinking
with respect to positions that had already been given to the other side," while
barring "discussing national security decision memoranda, any current negotiating po-
sition, and any internal memoranda that bore on the subject of SALT." He was not
asked where the Soviet "provocative attack" offer falls in those instructions. At Kissin-
ger's behest one former NSC staff member declined Newhouse's request to review
the galleys "for accuracy." There was no discussion at the hearings of whether any
other current or former staff member was asked, or agreed, to review Newhouse's
manuscript. Hearings on Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger Before the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 110-13, 331-32 (1973).
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leaks which have White House sanction are, in its view, good; those
which do not are bad-all without regard to their actual or potential
impact on negotiations or on American foreign policy generally.
Nixon's SALT achievement does not excuse police state tactics. Po-
litical misuse of the agreements, however, cannot erase the SALT
accomplishments. The agreements, in particular the ban on large-scale
ABM systems, are by many orders of magnitude the most significant
arms control pacts of the nuclear era, and Cold Dawn is an excellent
and historically valuable portrayal of the complex negotiations be-
hind them.
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